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ABSTRACT
The social discount rate is an important issue in the cost-benefit analysis
for selecting public projects. However there has been no general consensus as
to the appropriate value of the socieil rate of discount for public investment. In
1987, Quirk and Terasawa proposed using the opportunity cost rate of return
as an alternative approach to the choosing of the social discount rate in a fixed-
budget scenario. Essentially, the appropriate value of the government rate of
discount is the highest rate of return available from the portfolio of the
unfunded government projects.
In this study, the characteristics of the discount rates is explored in the
context of choosing an efficient portfolio of government projects under a fixed-
budget condition. The costs and benefits of the projects are treated as variables
and are to be endogenously determined by optimizing the overall discounted
benefits. It is assumed that the costs and benefits of projects are known and
continuous functions of force size, unit system maintenance, and operational
support.
A mathematical model is used to represent the relationship between the
benefit and cost of various projects. The Karesh-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) convexity
conditions are assumed for these so-called diminishing-return projects. In




are introduced as reference projects such that their rates of return can be used
directly as the discount rates under the concept of the opportunity cost rate of
return.
The discounted present values (DPV) of the net benefits of both the
optimal and non-optimal portfolios are found to be in agreement with those
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The concept and importance of the discount rate in the case where benefits
and costs are spread over time are well recognized and understood. However there
has been no general consensus as to the appropriate value of the social rate of
discount for public investment. This controversy persists today.
The main approaches taken so far are the second-best approach and the
opportunity cost approach. When government investment spending is at its optimum
level and the social rate of time preference is known, both approaches provide
similar results for the social rate of discount. However, the main difficulty has been
the estimation of the social rate of time preference. Often the consumer rate of
interest is incorrectly used in place of the social rate of time preference.
Instead of searching for the optimal level of government spending, Quirk and
Terasawa (QT) proposed using the opportunity cost rate of return as an alternative
approach to the choosing of the social discount rate in a fixed-budget scenario. As
proposed, the appropriate value of the government rate of discount is the highest
rate of return available from the portfolio of unfunded government projects.
B. PURPOSE OF STUDY
The purpose of this study is to explore the characteristics of social discount
rate in the context of choosing an efficient portfolio of government projects under a
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fixed-budget condition. The costs and benefits of the projects are treated as variables
and are to be endogenously determined by optimizing the overall discounted benefits.
Costs and benefits are endogenous because funding decisions can be revisited each
year not only for initial investment costs for new projects but also for maintenance
and support for old projects. It is assumed that the cost and benefit (input and output)
of projects are known and continuous functions offeree size (number of systems), unit
system maintenance and operational support.
C. LITERATURE SURVEY
The social discount rate is an important issue in cost-benefit analysis for
selecting public projects. In 1972 0MB Circular A-94 specified that a rate of 10% be
adopted for all U.S. federal agencies and departments. Since then some progress on
this issue has been made. But there is still lack of consensus on the appropriate choice
of the social discount rate. Randolph Lyon [8] recently reviewed the practices in
discounting public investments by the major U.S. government organizations and found
many inconsistencies. A good account of the important developments pertaining to the
social discount rate can be found in Lind [6] and QT [11].
In the so-called second-best approach, much of the work on the social discount
rate has been concentrated on choosing a rate that properly adjusts for the market
distortions caused by the corporate income tax. Usher [14] showed that the social
discount rate lies between the consumer rate of interest and the pre-tax rate of return
on corporate investment.
Another approach is one of opportunity cost. Using this approach, Ramsey [10]
showed that the social rate of discount should be a weighted average of the consumer
rate of interest and the pre-tax rate of return on corporate investment. The weight
is a function of the fraction of resources drawn from consumption versus investment.
Both Usher and Ramsey derived their results based on a two-period model. By
doing so, they avoided the issue of reinvestment of the proceeds of a project. To take
this secondary effect into account, the shadow price of capital problem was first
expounded by Marglin [9] and generalized by Bradford [1].
The idea is to convert all costs and benefits to consumption equivalents and
then to apply a single rate of discount to the benefit and cost streams. The shadow
price of capital is defined as the present value of the stream of consumption benefits
associated with $1 of private investment discounted at the social rate of time
preference. Drawing a distinction between the values of the shares of costs from
consumption and investment, the present value of a public program is given as follows
[S-39, 8]:
j; X, - [(l-c)n + c]C^
where X^ is the benefits consumed at time t
Ct is the cost at time t
c is the proportion of consumption
li is the shadow price of capital for which the rate of
return equals the corresponding opportunity cost of capital
i is the rate of time preference
Lyon [8] showed that the shadow price of capital, n, is highly sensitive to the
opportunity cost of capital, time preference and reinvestment rate, whose values are
uncertain by nature. Commonly, the consimier's rate of time preference is used in
place of the social rate of time preference. This simplification is unacceptable, because
it is true only for a single infinite-hfe consumer. Also, difficulties arise in choosing a
social discount rate in the case of intergenerational equity [S-20, 7], [P.22, 11].
The second-best approach and the opportunity cost approach provide similar
results for the social rate of discount if government investment spending is at an
optimum and if the social rate of time preference equals the consumer rate of
interest. However, the weights for the consumer rate of interest and the pre-tax rate
of return on corporate investment differ for the two approaches. Given that the social
rate of time preference is known, the second-best approach is the correct way to
choose both the level of government investment and then the social rate of discount
[P. 27, 11].
Lind [7], in his recent assessment, observed that international capital markets
are becoming more integrated and the U.S. economy more open. He argued that this
trend has a significant effect on the search for the discount rate. He suggested that
many conclusions based on models of a closed economy where total government and
private saving must equal private investment have to be modified significantly.
D. CONCEPT OF OPPORTUNITY COST RATE OF RETURN IN A FIXED
BUDGET SCENARIO
In 1987, QT [11] proposed an alternative approach, the third-best, to the
choosing of the social discount rate. As proposed, the appropriate value of the
government rate of discoiuit in a fixed-budget scenario should be the opportunity cost
rate of return. This is the highest rate of return available from the portfolio of the
unfunded government projects.
Firstly, it is not uncommon to find in practice the level of government
expenditure being fixed by some pohtical process with economic efficiency as one of
many decision factors. The selection of projects has to be made within such budget
constraints. The discount rate proposed for use by QT is the opportunity cost rate of
return; this is the highest rate of return available from the set of unfunded projects.
With this value of the discount rate, projects are funded only if the discounted present
value (DPV) of net benefits from a project is positive. On the other hand, the
unfunded projects shall have either zero or negative discounted present values.
The approach of opportunity cost rate of return is based purely on efficiency
grounds. The social rate of time preference as needed in the other approaches is not
required here. The intergenerational equity issue must be addressed separately. More
importantly, the discount rate chosen acts as a filter against manipulation of estimates
[P.41, 11], [P.21, 12].
One example is used to illustrate the apphcation of the concept and the
computation of DPVs in QT. The net benefits (benefits minus costs) for the available
projects over the period considered are predetermined separately. That is, the level
of costs and benefits are decided in their respective project planning process. No
communication between various project planners or adjustments to the relative
allocation of fund is attempted. Under a given budget limit in each year, the highest
rate of return of the unfunded projects is the choice of discount rate.
The example used for illustration in QT is reproduced in Table 1.1. A portfolio
of four projects are available for investment. Using the opportunity cost rate of return
approach, project B is funded. With project B funded, the portfolio of unfunded
projects are A, C and D. In this case, the highest rates of return of the unfunded
projects are 200% and 100% for period and period 1 respectively. The opportunity
cost rate of discount at t = 1 is the 100% of project D because it is the only rate of
return available. Using the opportunity cost rates of return as discount rates, the
discounted present values (DPV) of net benefits under project B is +$0.50, the DPV
of net benefits of project A or D is 0, and DPV of net benefits of project C is -$0.33.
It is observed that under the opportunity cost rate of return, project B is funded
because it has a positive DPV of net benefits and it exhausts the investment funds
available.
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Discount Rate 200% 100% -
E. MOTIVATION OF THIS STUDY
The above example as illustrated in QT is a case where the projects are of
constant returns to scale and their rates of return are fixed. The implication is that
there is no consultation nor communication among the project planning offices. All
project planning is carried out in isolation and optimization achieved at best locally
within the respective project planning process. The effects of local optimization is
reflected in the varying rates of return among the projects.
In this study, we are interested in a slightly more general scenario where there
are always existing projects and newly-proposed projects in £uiy year. All existing
projects need funding for operational support and maintenance (O&M) in order to
realize their benefits. Given a fixed budget for each year, the level of funding for O&M
has to be decided against the newly-proposed projects. In other words, to achieve
optimum edlocation of the given budget in each year, all existing projects £ire to
compete with other newly-proposed projects. This scenario is always valid at some
higher echelon in the government org£inization.
This scenario in turn sissumes that perfect flow of information occurs among
the planning of various projects in a portfoUo. Adjustment and redistribution is made
in the allocation of monetary resources among the efficient projects such that the sum
of all discounted outputs is maximized. Global optimization is the result of perfect
information sharing. In this instance, a unique rate of return for each year is shared
by all the selected projects.
Therefore, we plan to explore the characteristics of using the opportunity cost
of rate of return as the discount rate in the context of choosing an efficient portfoUo
of government projects, whose costs and benefits are to be endogenously determined
by optimizing the overall discounted benefits. Specifically we are interested in the
discounted present values (DPV) of the net benefits of both the funded and unfunded
projects.
For the purpose of this study, a mathematical model is used to represent the
relations between the benefit £ind cost of each project. This model is described in the
following chapter.
F. SCENARIO
1. A PORTFOLIO OF DEFENSE PROJECTS
All defense projects in the portfolio serve common ultimate goal(s), i.e.,
the benefits of one project can be replaced by others. Two types of projects are
considered:
- diminishing return projects (DRP) with respect to the O&M funds
allocated, and
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- reference projects of constant returns to scale.
a. DIMINISHING-RETURN PROJECT (DRP)
Generally, there are two distinct periods considered for each
project, i.e., initiation and operations. Initiation refers to the period when a project
undergoes development and production. During this period, initial investment is
needed to acquire the number of systems, initial spares, facilities, and basic training
at the initiation of project. Obviously there is no benefit derived during this period.
After initiation, the project enters the operations period until
retirement or upgrade. During this period, operational support and maintenance costs
are incurred for the upkeep of systems and operational readiness on a yearly basis.
Benefit or output is produced throughout the period. The level of output depends on
force size and the combination of both unit maintenance and operational support.
The term diminishing return projects (DRP) refers to the ones
where the rate of return (benefit) is diminishing with respect to the O&M fund
allocated during the period of operations. In other words, the marginal rate of return
decreases with an increase in the O&M cost.
b. REFERENCE PROJECT: CONSTANT RETURNS TO
SCALE
In addition to the diminishing-return projects, constant-returns-to-
scale projects are introduced as reference projects. The benefit of the reference project
is directly proportional to the initial funds allocated. In this instance, the reference
project has a two-year system life, with investment cost incurred in the year of
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initiation and a return is produced at a known fixed rate in the following year. The
rate of return of the reference projects is set so that it will serve as the highest rate
of return of the unfunded projects.
Under the concept of opportunity cost rate of return, the fixed
rates of return of these reference projects could be used appropriately as the discount
rates in maximizing the overall benefits. In essence, the reference projects allow the
discount rates to be treated as "exogenous", thus simplifying the computation ofDPVs
for the funded and unfunded projects while optimizing the overall discounted output
of the selected projects.
2. BENEFITS OF DEFENSE PROJECTS
Benefits of defense projects are much more difficult to quantify by their
very nature. One possible quantification is the measure of force eff'ectiveness (MOFE).
MOFE attempts to measure the performance of the force in a specific mission, taking
into considerations the command and control, doctrine and tactics, force capabilities,
etc. In addition, MOFE reflects the effectiveness of varying military capabilities and
the marginal effects of changes in force levels. The unit of MOFE varies according to
scenario. In this study, without delving into details, we assume that the unit ofMOFE
is convertible to an equivalent dollar value. This assumption is necessary to make the
costs and benefits directly comparable.
3. FIXED BUDGET
In the short run, it is fair to assume that the budget stream over the
near future is fixed. Under this budget constraint, the more efficient projects are to
10
be identified. The overall objective of defense planning then is to derive maximum




A mathematical model that represents the relationship between the cost and
benefit of a project is developed to facilitate the study of the discount rate and its
related issues. Using only essential factors, this model is intentionally kept simple, yet
it is able to capture some of the main features of the real world. The main factors
considered are the number of systems, system unit maintenance and its residual
effect, and system unit operational support.
B. ASSUMPTIONS
The following assumptions are made:
1. Input and output functions are nonlinear and continuous. For the
purpose of this study, the input and output of each project are assumed to be non-
linear functions of force size (i.e., number of systems), and system unit maintenance
and operational support. Continuous functions imply a continuous solution space,
within which the solution of optimum resource allocation lies. In addition, the
continuity assumption facilitates the search for the optimum solution using numerical
methods based on Karesh-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) conditions.
2. For the diminishing-return projects, the original benefit (output) is
monotonically decreasing with the system unit maintenance and support, and in fact
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we assume the benefit to be a concave function. The marginal cost (input) is
monotonically increasing with the system unit maintenance and support, or a convex
function. Mathematically maximizing the concave output function subject to convex
inequality constraints is a sufficient optimality condition for KKT (or KKT convexity
conditions) [p. 139, 2]. In general, the optimum solution found using KKT conditions
is local, and there is no assurance of a global optimization. The KKT convexity
condition used here is sufficient to ensure a global optimization.
3. The force size, or number of system, is assumed to be scaleable and
divisible in this study. That is, the number of systems is a continuous variable instead
of a discrete variable. This assumption is particularly acceptable for large force sizes
where the effect of divisibility becomes negligible.
C. THE MODEL
The mathematical expression of the objective function, input and output
functions, and budget constraint are described in this section. As mentioned earher,
for each project, two distinct periods (without overlap) in the entire system life are
considered, i.e., initiation and operations. The year when a project begins is the year
of project initiation. During this initial period, the systems undergo development and
production. For simplicity, the cost of systems incurred during project initiation is
lumped into a one-year period so as to be consistent with the following operating
years. Since the system is under development and production, there is no benefit
produced during this period.
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After the period of initiation, the systems proceed to a period of operations until
system retirement or upgrade. During the entire operating period, maintenance and
operational support costs are incurred on a yearly basis. Naturally benefit or output
is produced throughout the system operations. The level of output would depend on
the combination of both the unit system maintenance and operational support.
Maintenance includes both the scheduled and unscheduled maintenance of the
systems. The operational supports entail training of operators, exercises,
transportation of systems, operational deployment, etc.
All projects could begin or end in any year within the period considered. The
subscripts i and t represent the project and year, respectively.
1. Objective Function
The objective is to maximize the sum of the discounted benefits of all
selected projects over the period considered. The discount rates used in the objective
function are those generated by the opportunity cost rate of return concept. It is
assumed that benefit is derived from a project throughout its entire life except in the
year of initiation. Under the concept of opportunity cost rate of return as the discount
rate, the discount rate is the highest rate of return available from the set of unfunded
projects in each year. The objective function is given as follows:
T I
Max Y. Y. ^t*Xit •• (1)'
t=i 1=1
where X^^ is the output of project i in year t






where dr^ is the discount rate for year t
2. Fixed Budget Level
As explained earlier, the budget level for each year, Bj , is predetermined.
Thus the sum of all budget allocations for the selected projects must not exceed this
budget limit. There are three types of cost factors considered for each of the selected
projects:
a. cost of initial investment, IQ
b. cost of maintenance, CMj^
c. cost of operational support, CSjt
The cost of initial investment is a function of unit system cost, K^ , and
force size or number of systems, Nj . Initial investment is incurred in the year when
the project begins. Those projects that are not funded shall have zero initial
investment with no systems acquired. On the other hand, the costs of maintenance
and operational support are incurred in the years following the year of initiation until
the end of system life. The cost functions of maintenance and operational support are
described in later paragraphs. The budget constraint is given as follows:
15





E t (^i*^i)g,= t -^ (CHit + C-S,,)^^,, ] ^ B,, V t . . . (22?)
where B^ is the budget Umit in year t
Kj is the unit system cost of project i
Nj is the number of systems of project i
Qi is the starting year for project i
3. Benefit (Output) Function
Benefit or output is produced by each project when the system is in
operation. The output of the project in each year is a function of force size, and the
unit system maintenance and operational support, i.e.,
X^^ = N^*{u^*Mii*S^i) , Vi,t... (3)
where X^^ is the output of project i in year t
Uj is a conversion factor from benefit to dollar value
Nj is the number of systems acquired with project i
Mjt is the effective unit system maintenance level
for project i in year t
Sjt is the unit system support level of project i
in year t
aj is the exponent of M^
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b; is the exponent of Sjt
The exponents Oj and b; are the elasticities that shape the effects of unit
system maintenance and support on the level of output. They are the measures of the
percentage change in the level of output in response to a one percent change in its
unit system maintenance level and unit system support level, respectively, i.e.,
a,. =
'' and b, = ^^
In this study, the exponents or elasticities for each project is held
constant throughout the system life. The sum of aj and bj is less than one, which is
also homothetic, satisfies the KKT convexity conditions. Additionally, the output is
directly proportional to the number of systems.
4. Residual Characteristics of Maintenance
The idea of residual maintenance is perceived from the fact that the
effects of maintenance performed in the previous year does not usually disappear
suddenly. Instead, maintenance is assumed to be decaying at some constEint rate,
called the residual index, d, of value between and 1. A zero value for d means no
residual effects, while a d of one signifies that the maintenance effects are perpetual.
In general, the residual index represents a percentage of maintenance level that is
carried forward to the following year. This condition also serves as a link between the
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years of operation of the projects. Hence, the maintengince function is formulated as:
Mit = ^i,t-i*cfi + m^^, V i, t ... (4)
where m^^ is the flow of unit system maintenance actually
provided to project i in year t
Mji is the stock of unit system maintenance representing
the sum of m.^^ and the residual effects of maintenance from
previous year, i.e., Mj^.!
di is the residual index of maintenance for project i
5. Cost Functions
There are two kinds of costs incurred during operations: maintenance
cost and operational support cost. The KKT convexity condition requires the marginal
cost to be monotonically increasing with respect to the levels of unit system
maintenance and operational support, while the marginal output be monotonically
decreasing.
a. Maintenance Cost Function
Maintenance cost of each project in each year is a function of force
size and level of unit system maintenance. The cost is assumed to be directly
proportional to the number of systems. The maintenance cost of each project in each
year (CMji) is given as follows:
CW^t = iV^i*(Vj*77?"0 , Vi,t... (5)
where V; is a conversion factor from level of maintenance
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to dollars
Nj is the number of systems acquired with project i
mjt is the flow of unit system maintenance
actually provided to project i in year t.
a, is the exponent of m.
The exponent a^ can be interpreted as the elasticity, i.e., the
measure of the percentage change in the cost of maintenance in response to a one
percent change in its level of system unit maintenance. Under the KKT convexity
condition, the elasticity, Oj, has to be greater than one. In addition, it assumes a
constant value throughout the system life.
b. Operational Support Cost Function
Operational support cost of each project in each year is a function
of force size and level of unit system operational support. Again the cost is assumed
to be directly proportional to the number of systems. The operational support cost of
each project in each year (CSjt) is given as follows:
CS^^ = Ni*iw^*S^A) ' Vi,t... (6)
where W; is a conversion factor from level of support to dollar
value
19
Nj is the number of systems acquired with project i
Sjt is the level of support provided to project i in year t
Pi is the exponent of m^
Like ttj, the economic interpretation of the exponent p^ is the
elasticity, i.e., the measure of the percentage change in the cost of operational support
in response to a one percent change in its unit system support level. Similarly, under
the KKT convexity condition, the elasticity, ^j, has to be greater than one. In addition,
^i assumes a constant value throughout the system hfe.
(^^)
^it
D. SIMPLIFIED ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK
In this section, a simplified analytical framework, where all diminishing-return
projects begin in year 1, is provided. As presented in the earlier section, the sum of
discounted benefits of all funded projects over the years considered are to be
maximized and expenditures are subject to the budget constraint in each year. Besides
the benefit and cost functions, the lingering effects of maintenance are known. The








n (l + cfr,)
t=i
and til and /tt are the Lagrange multipliers for the
initial year and the subsequent years respectively.
The Lagrange multipliers, li^ and Hi are associated with budget constraints for
the initial and succeeding years. The Lagrange multiplier of any year is also called the
shadow price of that budget constraint and is defined as the change in the overall
discounted outputs with respect to the change in budget level in that year for this
problem, i.e.,
where X is the sum of overall discounted output
B^ is the budget constraint for year t.
As it is, equation (7) cannot be solved directly if the discount factor, Dt, is
treated as a variable. In this instance, the discount factor is the inverse of a compound
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factor of discount rates, each being an unknown variable. In order to use the existing
method of Lagrange, in this study, the discount factor has to be a given parameter
(this point is further explained later in Section F of this chapter). Now, differentiating






- \i^*Nj^*Vj^*a^*mii' = , V i. . . (8)
S^^: D^* {N^*u^*Mii*b^*S^i''')
- \i^*Ni*Wi*^i*Sil'^ = , Vi, t . . . (9)
However, the above set of equations is still too complicated to be solved
analytically. One way is to allow some of the input parameters to assume some
convenient values. Such simplification has been used to verify the results of the
computer implementation (which is described in Chapter III).
E. OUTPUT PARAMETERS
There are two main output parameters to be computed from the above model.




As defined earlier, the shadow price in this problem represents the
change in the overall discounted benefits of an additional unit of budget allocation. It
is a function of budget limit in each year. Under the condition of global optimization,
all selected projects in the same year share the same shadow price.
2. Discounted Present Value (DPV) of the Net Benefits
The discounted present value (DPV) of the net benefits of each project
is the sum of all discounted net benefits of the entire system life, i.e.,
T




n (l + cfr,)
T = l
IQ = Ki*Ni
Xjj is the output of project i in year t
dr^ is the discount rate for year r
C, = CM, + CS,
F. DILEMMAS AND THEIR REMEDIES
Three dilemmas are encountered in the process of implementing the above
initial formulation. They are summarized as follows:
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1. Before solving the objective function subject to the budget constraints, we
have no knowledge of which projects from the portfolio would be selected for
funding. In other words, the set of unfunded projects is not known. This
information is essential in identifying the rate of discount.
2. Values of appropriate discount rates are not directly available from the above
formulation. This is because the relation between shadow price and rate of
return is necessary yet it is not available.
3. Related to the first problem, since unfunded projects are excluded from
funding, the shadow prices of these unfunded projects will not be available from
the solution for the initial formulation.
To get around the problems, some two-year reference projects are introduced
for convenience. The characteristic of each reference project is such that investment
cost is incurred in the year of initiation £ind return is produced at a known fixed rate
in the following year. The fixed rate of this reference project is set at an appropriate
level so that it can be treated as the highest rate of return of some unfunded projects
at the margin. Therefore it can be used directly as the discount rate in the objective
function under the concept of opportunity cost of rate of return. With these rates from
the reference projects, the other diminishing-return projects in the portfolio that have
lower rates of return will be excluded from funding. The discounted present value
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(DPV) of the net benefits of the funded projects will be observed in the process of
optimizing the overall discounted output.
The output of the reference project is directly proportional to the investment
cost in the previous year, i.e.,
R^ = (l+r^) *i?Cj._i . . . (11)
where R^ is the output of the reference project in year t
r^ is the rate of return of the reference project in year t
RCn is the investment cost of reference project in
the previous year
To find out the DPVs of the unfunded projects or non-optim£j set of projects,
a two-step procedure is adopted. In the first optimization process, the optimal set of
(efficient) projects is identified. Then using any non-optimal portfolio, by removing any
of the efficient project(s), under same budget constraint and known rates of discount,
the DPVs for the non-optimal set of projects are to be calculated in the second













(discount rate, dr^ is the rate of return of
the reference project invested in year (t-1))
Subject to:
where
^ic = AT^.t-i + c? + ^ic V i, t
R^ = (l+r^) i?Ct._i, V t
Decision variables:
^it' ^it' -^it' S'it' ^i' Rjt' ^jt Vi,j,t
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III. IMPLEMENTATION USING GAMS
A. INTRODUCTION
Instead of using an analytical approach to solve the modified formulation,
nimierical solutions are computed based on the Karesh-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT)
conditions. The formulation is implemented in GAMS, a software package for solving
optimization problems.
B. NONLINEAR PROGRAMMING (NLP)
In nonlinear programming, the objective function provides the desired direction
for improvement and the set of constraints defines the feasible space in which the
optimum solution lies. The search for the optimum solution begins with an arbitrary
point in the space, then proceeding toward the "improving direction", at each step
satisfying the Karesh-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) conditions [2]. The search continues until
a point where there is no more "improving direction" within a specified tolerance.
C. GAMS
GAMS (the acronym stands for General Algebraic Modeling System) [3], a
software package, is chosen to implement the NLP model. Specifically, a solver called
MIN0S5 is used. Using algebraic modeling concepts, GAMS makes the construction
and solution of large and complex mathematical programming models more
straightforward and comprehensible. The GAMS listing are given in Appendix A
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Due to the nature of the search, the appropriate KKT convexity condition is
assumed for the benefit and cost functions in order to ensure a global optimum
solution. Two output parameters are generated by the GAMS program: shadow prices
and the discounted present values (DPV) of the net benefits.
D. ADVANTAGES OF GAMS
The advantages of GAMS implementations are as follows:
a. fast execution time (using a mainframe computer)
b. allows change of input parameters with ease, e.g., different starting and
ending years of project. (In the case of an analj^ical approach, such changes in
input entail a new set of derivations.)
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IV. NUMERICAL ANALYSIS USING THE MODEL
A. INTRODUCTION
In this illustration, a portfolio of three diminishing-return projects and three
reference projects are considered over a period of three years. All diminishing-return
projects begin in year 1 and end in year 3. The reference projects are constant returns
to scale and their rates of return are set so that they will constitute the marginal
project in each period. The three reference projects start in year 1, year 2 and year
3, respectively. Note that the only project that produces in year 4 is reference project
3.
By construction, we are able to use the rates of return of the reference project
as the discount rate in the objective function, i.e., the sum of the discounted output
of the selected projects. The aim of this analysis is to observe the resulting discounted
present values (DPV) of the net benefits of the optimal and non-optimal set of
projects, and to find out if they are congruent with the expectation of the concept of
opportunity cost rate of return.
B. INPUT PARAMETERS
As mentioned, all diminishing-return projects start in year 1 and end in year
3. Year 1 corresponds to the year of initiation, while year 2 and 3 are for operations
and thus output is produced. At this stage, we assume a residual maintenance of 10%
for all three diminishing-return projects. The input parameters for the three
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diminishing-return projects are tabulated in Table 4.1.
The rates of return for reference projects 1, 2 and 3 are 0.536, 0.3 and 0.3
respectively as shown in Table 4.2. The rate of return for reference project 1 is set at
0.536 because it would not be selected at any lower rate. Under the concept of
opportunity cost of rate of return, all reference projects are to be the marginal
projects, whose rates of return are the highest among unfunded projects for the
particular year, before their rates of return could be used as the discount rates. At a
rate of return of 0.536, reference project 1 becomes the marginal project (refer to
Appendix B for more details). Finally the budget limits for this analysis are 15, 20 and
20 units for year 1, 2 and 3 respectively, as shown in Table 4.3.


































































C. STEP 1 - DPV OF THE OPTIMAL PORTFOLIO
As mentioned in Section F of Chapter II, at the first step of the two-step
procedure, it is necessary to identify the optim£il set of projects and the unfunded
projects while optimizing the total discounted output within the budget constraints.
As shown in Table 4.4, the projects selected are project 2 and reference projects 2 and
3. The set of unfunded projects are projects 1 and 3, and reference project 1. The
veirious costs incurred in funding these projects are tabulated in Table 4.5.
Table 4.4 Undiscounted Output of the Funded Projects










Total 24.9 34.9 9.9 71.1
Table 4.5 Cost Measure of the Funded Projects














Total 15.0 20.0 20.0
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Table 4.6 shows the DPVs of the selected project. For the given discount rates,
project 2 has a positive DPV of slightly above zero (i.e., 0.004), while reference
projects 2 and 3 have values of zero.
Table 4.6 Discounted Present Value (DPV) of the Net
Benefits for the Funded Projects










Total -15.0 16.9 8.6 11.4 0.004
Examination of the shadow prices provides some insight. When reference
projects are selected, the shadow price for that particular year is compelled to take
on the value of the corresponding rate of return. This is necessary so as to maintain
a uniform shadow price for all selected projects in any year.
Table 4.7 Shadow Prices
Year 1 Year 2 Year 3
Shadow Prices, /i(t) 1.001 0.651 0.501
/x(min) * 1.00 0.651 0.501
Discount Rate 0.536 0.3
Discount Factor 1 1.536 1.997
* Right-hand side of equation (14)
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In general, when maximizing the simi ofthe discounted output, the relationship
among shadow prices in any year, /i^, and the rates of return of reference projects and
the choice of discount rates are given as follows:
y,^^--llLl—, Vt ...(13)
n (l + cfr,)
where r^ is the rate of return of reference project for
year t-1
dr^ is the discount rate for year t, and dr^ =
The equality holds whenever the reference project is selected for funding. This
is observed in Table 4.7 where reference projects 2 and 3, are selected in year 2 and
3 respectively (note the equality between /ij and /i(min)). Otherwise the shadow price
is strictly greater than the right hand side of equation (13). This can be observed in
year 1 of this example as presented in Table 4.7. In this instance, the diminishing-
return projects achieve slightly higher returns than the reference project 1.
In this illustration, since the rates of return of the reference projects are used
as the discount rate for the following year (i.e., doc^^^ = rj, the above equation is
reduced as follows:
\it ^ — . V t ... (14)
T = l
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D. STEP 2 - DPV OF THE NON-OPTIMAL PORTFOLIO
The funded projects have been identified in step 1, i.e., project 2 and reference
projects 2 and 3. Now at step 2, three non-optimal portfohos are considered, in each
case an efficient project is removed, as shown in Table 4.8. The DPV for each non-
optimal portfolio is determined by optimizing the overall discounted output, under the
same budget constraint and discount rates. The status of the projects in each non-
optimal portfolio is shown Table 4.8. The DPV of portfolio 1 is zero because only the
reference projects are selected, while the DPVs of the other two are -0.6 and -0.64
(detailed output sire shown in Appendix C). These results of zero or negative DPV for
the non-optimal portfolios are consistent with the expectation of the concept of
opportunity cost rate of return.






























V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
A. CONCLUSIONS
The debate on the issue of the social discount rate will continue. This study
does not claim or intend to address all the problems at once. Instead the concept of
opportunity cost rate of return, as proposed by Quirk and Terasawa, is examined in
a slightly more general scenario where the portfolio of government projects, whose
costs and benefits are to be endogenously determined by optimizing the overall
discounted benefits. The initial formulation given in this report is an attempt to
provide an operational structure to approach this problem. However, it was found
difficult to solve in the context of a GAMS program. The main reason is because the
set of unfunded projects is not known before the initial formulation is solved. Yet the
knowledge of the set of unfunded projects is essential in identifying the appropriate
choice of the discount rates.
To study the nature of the funded and unfunded projects, reference projects of
constant returns to scale are introduced. Their rates of return are fixed such that they
can be used as the discount rates, thus making the discount rates constant in the
objective function. The modified formulation is then directly solvable. A numerical
solution based on the Karesh-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) conditions is used to solve the
formulation.
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The resulting DPVs were found to be in agreement with those expected under
the concept of opportunity cost rate of return. The DPV of the optimal portfolio is
positive, while the DPVs of the non-optimal portfolios are either zero or negative.
The concept of opportunity cost rate of return as discount rate is a viable
alternative in the selection of the social rate of discount. The attempt to illustrate the
concept using more general cost and benefit functions in this study does not in any
way affect the foundation of the concept. What this study revealed is still a significant
verification of the concept of opportunity cost rate of return, and is undoubtedly
encouraging.
B. RECOMMENDATIONS
Further research areas on the characteristics and the related issues pertaining
to the opportunity cost rate of return as the social discount rate are suggested as
follows:
- Since the set of unfunded projects has an effect on the choice of discount rate,
the impacts of different rates of return of the reference projects on the
discounted present values (DPV) of the net benefits of various projects, both
funded and unfunded, could be further examined.
- The residual effect of maintenance is an issue which deserves further study.
Such efforts could include exploration of alternative models and vaUdation of
this phenomenon using real data.
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- In this study, the KKT convexity conditions are used to shape the relationship
between cost and benefit of the diminishing-return projects. Other kinds of
relationships could be considered in future studies.
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APPENDIX A: PROGRAM LISTING
$TITLE STUDY OF DISCOUNT RATES
$OFFUPPER OFFSYMLIST OFFSYMXREF




* DISCOUNT RATE *
* VERSION 11.3 NLP *
* *
* 2.9.91 - NG K C *
*******************************
THIS IS AN GAMS IMPLEMENTATION OF A MATHEMATICAL MODEL THAT DEPICTS THE
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN COSTS AND BENEFITS OF PROJECTS IN A PORTFOLIO. IT IS
DEVELOPED TO FACILITATE THE STUDY OF DISCOUNT RATE, USING THE OPPORTUNITY COST
CONCEPT OF RATE OF RETURN. THE MAIN FACTORS CONSIDERED ARE NUMBER OF SYSTEMS,
UNIT SYSTEM MAINTENANCE AND ITS RESIDUAL EFFECT, AND UNIT SYSTEM OPERATIONAL
SUPPORTS.
$OFFTEXT
SETS I DRP PROJECTS / PR0J1*PR0J3 /
T YEARS / YEAR1*YEAR4 /
K DATA SET 1 (DRP) / B, C, A, P, ALPHA, BETA, U,V,W,D,H/
L CONSTRAINTS / REQUIRE, BUDGET /
12 REF PROJECTS / REF1*REF3 /
KK DATA SET 2 (REF) / PP,R,HH/ ;
ALIAS (T,TT);
ALIAS (I, II);
TABLE BEGIN(I,T) STATUS OF DIMINISHING-RETURN PROJECTS OVER THE YEARS





* 1: PERIOD OF INITIATION
* 0: PERIOD OF OPERATIONS
*
-1: PROJECT INACTIVE
TABLE BB(I2,T) STATUS OF REFERENCE PROJECTS OVER THE YEARS


























U V W D H
.60 .20 .65 .1 1
.72 .35 .20 .1 1
.70 .45 .40 .1 1





TABLE DATA2(I2,KK) INPUT PARAMETERS FOR REFERENCE PROJECTS
PP R HH
REFl 1 1.536 1
REF2 1 1.30 1
REF3 1 1.30 1 ;
TABLE LIMIT{L,T) REQUIREMENT AND BUDGET CONSTRAINTS
YEARl YEAR2 YEAR3 YEAR4
REQUIRE .0 .0 .0
BUDGET 15.0 20.0 20.0 20.0
* REQUIRE: OUTPUT (BENEFIT) REQUIREMENTS
* BUDGET: BUDGET LIMITS
PARAMETER DRA(T) DISCOUNT FACTORS;
DRAC'YEARl" = 1 + DR("YEAR1");



















INITIAL COST OF EACH PROJECT





PROJCOST(I,T) COST OF PROJECT I IN YEAR T
DECAY ( I, T) DECAY OF MAINTENANCE ;
OBJ.. Z =E= SUM(T,
SUM(I $((DATA(I,"H") EQ 1)AND(BEGIN(I,T) EQ 0)) ,DATA(I, "U")*
(N(I)**DATA(I,"A"))*
((1+DR)**(1-0RD(T)))*(MM(I,T)**DATA(I,"B"))*(S(I,T)**DATA(I,"C")))
- 50*E{T) ) + SUM({T,I2)
$((DATA2(I2,"HH") EQ 1)AND(BB(I2J) EQ 0)),
((1+DR)**(1-0RD(T)))*DATA2(I2,"R")*CC(I2,T-1) ) ;
REQUIRE{T).. SUM(I $({DATA(I, "H") EQ 1)AND(BEGIN{I,T) EQ 0)),
DATA{I,"U")*{N{I)**DATA(I,"A"))*
(MM(I,T)**DATA(I,"B"))*(S(I,T)**DATA(I,"C"))) +
SUM{I2 ${(DATA2(I2,"HH") EQ 1)AND(BB(I2,T) EQ 0)),
DATA2{I2,"R")*CC(I2,T-1)) =G= LIMIT("REQUIRE",T) ;
COST(T).. SUM(I, (DATA(I,"V")*N(I)*(M(I,T)**DATA{I,"ALPHA"))
+ DATA{I,"W")*N{I)*{S(I,T)**DATA(I,"BETA")))
$((DATA(I,"H") EQ 1) AND (BEGIN(I,T) EQ 0))
+ {DATA{I,"P")*N(I))
${(DATA(I,"H") EQ 1) AND (BEGIN(I,T) EQ 1))) +
SUM(I2, CC(I2,T) $({DATA2(I2,"HH") EQ 1) AND (BB(I2,T) EQ 1)))
=L= LIMIT("BUDGET",T) + E(T);
DECAY(I,T) ${{DATA(I,"H") EQ 1) AND {BEGIN(I,T) EQ 0))..
MM(I,T) =E=
MM{I,T-1)*DATA(I,"D") $(BEGIN(I,T-1) EQ 0) + M(I,T);
** BOUNDS OF VARIABLES **
E.FX(T) = 0;
N.LO(I) $(DATA{I,"H") EQ 1) = 0.0001;
N.L(I) ${DATA{I,"H") EQ 1) = 1.0;
MM.LO{I,T) $(DATA(I,"H") EQ 1) = 0.001;
M.LO(I,T) ${DATA{I,"H") EQ 1) = 0.001;
S.LO(I,T) ${DATA{I,"H") EQ 1) = 0.001;
MM.L(I,T) $(DATA(I,"H") EQ 1) = 1;
M.L(I,T) ${DATA{I,"H") EQ 1) = 1;
S.L(I,T) $(DATA(I,"H") EQ 1) = 1;
MODEL DISCOUNT /OBJ, REQUIRE, COST, DECAY/ ;
SOLVE DISCOUNT USING NLP MAXIMIZING Z ;





PARAMETER REP0RT2(*,*) UNDISCOUNTED OUTPUT MEASURES;
REP0RT2(I,T) ${(DATA(I,"H") EQ 1) AND (BEGIN(I,T) EQ 0)) =
DATA(I,"U")*(N.L(I)**DATA(I,"A"))*
((MM.L(I,T)**DATA(I,"B"))*(S.L(I,T)**DATA(I,"C")));
REPORT2(I2,T) $({DATA2(I2,"HH") EQ 1) AND (BB(I2,T) EQ 0)) =
DATA2(I2,"R")*CC.L(I2,T-1);
REP0RT2(I,"T0TAL") = SUM(T, REP0RT2(I,T)) ;
REPORT2(I2, "TOTAL") = SUM(T, REPORT2(I2,T))
;
REP0RT2( "TOTAL", T) = SUM{I $(DATA(I, "H") EQ 1), REP0RT2(I,T) ) +
SUM(I2 $(DATA2{I2, "HH") EQ 1),
REPORT2(I2,T));
REP0RT2("T0TAL", "TOTAL") = SUM{T, REP0RT2("T0TAL",T))
;
REP0RT2{"REQ'D",T) = LIMIT{"REQUIRE",T) ;
REP0RT2("REQ'D", "TOTAL") = SUM(T, REP0RT2("REQ'D" ,T) )
REP0RT2("EXCESS",T) = REP0RT2("T0TAL",T) - REP0RT2("REQ'D",T)
;
REP0RT2("EXCESS", "TOTAL") = SUM(T, REP0RT2("EXCESS",T))
;
DISPLAY REP0RT2;
PARAMETER REPORTS {*,T) PROJECT COST MEASURES;
REP0RT3(I,T) $({DATA(I,"H") EQ 1) AND (BEGIN{I,T) EQ 0)) =
DATA(I,"V")*N.L{I)*(M.L(I,T)**DATA(I,"ALPHA"))
+ DATA(I,"W")*N.L{I)*(S.L(I,T)**DATA(I,"BETA"));
REPORT3(I2,T) ${(DATA2(I2, "HH") EQ 1) AND (BB{I2,T) EQ 1)) =
CC.L(I2,T) ;
REP0RT3{I,T) $({BEGIN(I,T) EQ 1) AND (DATA(I,"H") EQ 1)) =
DATA{I,"P")*N.L(I);
REP0RT3("T0TAL",T) = SUM(I ${DATA(I, "H") EQ 1), REP0RT3(I,T)) +
SUM{I2 $(DATA2{I2,"HH") EQ 1), REP0RT3(I2,T) )
;
DISPLAY REP0RT3;
PARAMETER REP0RT4{*,T) MAINTENANCE COST OF DRP;
REP0RT4(I,T) ${(DATA{I,"H") EQ 1) AND (BEGIN(I,T) EQ 0)) =
DATA(I,"V")*N.L(I)*(M.L(I,T)**DATA{I,"ALPHA"));
REP0RT4{ "TOTAL", T) = SUM(I $(DATA(I , "H") EQ 1), REP0RT4(I,T))
DISPLAY REP0RT4;
PARAMETER REP0RT5{*,T) SUPPORT COST OF DRP;
REP0RT5(I,T) $((DATA(I,"H") EQ 1) AND (BEGIN(I,T) EQ 0)) =
DATA(I,"W")*N.L{I)*(S.L(I,T)**DATA{I,"BETA"));
REP0RT5( "TOTAL", T) = SUM(I $(DATA(I, "H") EQ 1), REP0RT5(I,T))
DISPLAY REPORTS;
PARAMETER XX(I,T) NET BENEFITS OF PROJECTS;






APPENDIX B: RATE OF RETURN OF REFERENCE PROJECT
A. INTRODUCTION
Ideally we would like to have all the reference projects to be selected with some
diminishing-return projects, so that their rates of return can be used appropriately as
the discount rates under the concept of the opportunity cost of rate of return.
However, this was found to be not achievable in this present model. In this problem,
all projects begin in year 1. When different values of discount rates are used, the
reference projects selected for funding are either reference project 1 or reference
projects 2 and 3. The only time when all three reference projects coexist in the funded
set is when there are no other diminishing projects. This is because both the benefit
and cost are linearly related to the number of systems.
To be consistent with the opportunity cost of rate of return, the rate of return
of the reference project that is not selected has to be adjusted upward until it
becomes the marginal rate. In this section, we show how this is done.
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B. INPUT PARAMETERS
Table Bl show the input parameters. This same set of inputs is used in the
main text as well.
Table Bl Input Parameters for Projects
Exponents Unit Exponents Conversion Residual
in Benefit System in Cost Factors Mainte-
Function Price Function nance
Project a b K a ^ u V w d
1 0.6 0.4 0.14 1.5 2.0 0.56 0.21 0.66 0.1
2 0.5 0.4 0.28 1.8 2.0 0.70 0.35 0.20 0.1
3 0.2 0.8 0.30 2.0 1.5 0.70 0.45 0.40 0.1
C. SUMMARY OF RESULTS
Table B2 Summary of Results









































44.95 38.19 38.04 38.02 38.28
DPV +2.73 +0.06 0.004 0.0 +0.10
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1. CASE 1
Rate of Return of Reference Projects (0.3, 0.3, 0.3)
Total Discounted Output, Z = 44.95
Table B3.1 Output Measure (undiscounted)










Total 24.9 34.9 11.4 71.1
Table B3.2 Cost Measure














Total 15.0 20.0 20.0
Table B3.3 Net Benefits for Projects










Net -15.0 4.9 14.9 11.4 2.73
Table B3.4 Shadow Prices
Year 1 Year 2 Year 3
Shadow Prices 1.182 0.769 0.592
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2. CASE 2
Rate of Return of Reference Projects (0.53, 0.3, 0.3)
Total Discounted Output, Z = 38.19
Table B4.1 Output Measure (undiscounted)










Total 24.9 34.9 11.4 71.1
Table B4.2 Cost Measure














Total 15.0 20.0 20.0
Table B4.3 Net Benefits for Projects










Net -15.0 4.9 14.9 11.4 0.063
Table B4.4 Shadow Prices
Year 1 Year 2 Year 3
Shadow Prices 1.004 0.654 0.503
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3. CASE 3A
Rate of Return of Reference Projects (0.536, 0.3, 0.3)
Total Discounted Output, Z = 38.041
Table B4.1 Output Measure (undiscounted)










Total 24.9 34.9 11.4 71.1
Table B4.2 Cost Measure














Total 15.0 20.0 20.0
Table B4.3 Net Benefits for Projects










Net -15.0 4.9 14.9 11.4 0.004
Table B4.4 Shadow Prices
Year 1 Year 2 Year 3
Shadow Prices 1.001 0.651 0.501
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4. CASE 3B
Rate of Return of Reference Projects (0.537, 0.3, 0.3)
Total Discounted Output, Z = 38.02
Table B5.1 Output Measure (undiscounted)










Total 23.1 26.0 26.0 75.1
Table B5.2 Cost Measure







Total 15.0 20.0 20.0
Table B5.3 Net Benefits for Projects







Net -15.0 3.1 6.0 26.0 0.0
Table B5.4 Shadow Prices
Year 1 Year 2 Year 3
Shadow Prices 1.000 0.651 0.500
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5. CASE 4
Rate of Return of Reference Projects (0.537, 0.28, 0.3)
Total Discounted Output, Z = 38.28
Table B6.1 Output Measure (undiscounted)










Total 24.9 34.7 11.4 71.0
Table B6.2 Cost Measure














Total 15.0 20.0 20.0
Table B6.3 Net Benefits for Projects










Net -15.0 4.9 14.7 11.4 0.102
Table B6.4 Shadow Prices
Year 1 Year 2 Year 3
Shadow Prices 1.007 0.651 0.508
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APPENDIX C: NON-OPTIMAL PORTFOLIOS
A. CASE 1 (REMOVE PROJECT 2)
Rate of Return of Reference Projects (0.536, 0.3, 0.3)
Total Discounted Output, Z = 38.037
Table 01. 1 Undiscounted Output of the Unfunded Projects









Total 23.0 26.0 75.0
Table CI. 2 Cost Measure of the Unfunded Projects







Total 15.0 20.0 20.0
Table CI. 3 Discounted Present Value (DPV) of the Net
Benefits for the Funded Projects







Total -15.0 3.0 6.0 26.0
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B. CASE 2 (REMOVE REFERENCE PROJECT 2)
Rate of Return of Reference Projects (0.536, 0.3, 0.3)
Total Discounted Output, Z = 37.435
Table 02. 1 Undiscounted Output of the Unfunded Projects







Total 31.2 25.3 11.4 68.0
Table 02. 2 Cost Measure of the Unfunded Projects












Total 15.0 20.0 20.0
Table 02.3 Discounted Present Value (DPV) of the Net
Benefits for the Funded Projects






Total -15.0 11.2 5.3 11.4 -0.6
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C. CASE 3 (REMOVE REFERENCE PROJECT 3)
Rate of Return of Reference Projects (0.536, 0.3, 0.3)
Total Discounted Output, Z = 37.396
Table 03. 1 Undiscounted Output of the Unfunded Projects







Total 24.9 42.4 67.2
Table C3.2 Cost Measure of the Unfunded Projects












Total 15.0 20.0 20.0
Table C3.3 Discounted Present Value (DPV) of the Net
Benefits for the Funded Projects








Total -15.0 4.9 22.4 -0.64
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